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Social Fractionalization, Political Instability,
and the Size of Government
ANTHONY ANNETT*
This paper explores the relationship between the degree of division or fractional-
ization of a country’s population (along ethnolinguistic and religious dimensions)
and both political instability and government consumption, using a neoclassical
growth model. The principal idea is that greater fractionalization, proxying for the
degree of conflict in society, leads to political instability, which in turn leads to
higher government consumption aimed at placating the opposition. There is also
a feedback mechanism whereby the higher consumption leads to less instability as
government consumption reduces the risk of losing office. Empirical evidence
based on panel estimation supports this hypothesis. [JEL E62, O23]
W
hen countries are heavily divided along ethnic, religious, communal, and
regional lines, they are likely to experience bouts of political violence and
are prone to the frequent breakdown of law and order. Clearly, serious conflict
between competing groups, especially violent conflict, would be harmful to
economic growth and the process of development. In such a divided country, can
the government use expenditure to appease the competing groups and will this
contain the potential conflict?
To isolate the sources of conflict, this paper follows the political economy
literature in treating society as a collection of disparate groups, each concerned
about its own interests at the expense of social welfare. Specifically, the degree
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of fractionalization within a country is measured along two dimensions, ethno-
linguistic and religious. Although imprecise as a measure of the strength of
competing groups, indices of fractionalization have the advantage of facili-
tating a broad cross-sectional empirical analysis with a large number of coun-
tries. The main hypothesis is that fractionalization leads inherently to greater
levels of political instability and this imposes a political cost on the government
as it risks being overthrown and losing any rents from being in power.
Therefore the government attempts to placate the excluded groups by
increasing the level of government consumption. This leads to a reduction in
instability and thus buys the government a certain amount of insurance against
being overthrown. Government consumption is thus used to reduce the level of
“political risk.”
A crucial assumption here is that the government does not use budgetary
transfers to placate the other groups in society. This assumption is not unrea-
sonable, given that many countries (especially in the developing world) lack the
institutions necessary for a system of fiscal transfers and government consump-
tion is often used for this purpose. For the period 1981–90, the ratio of govern-
ment consumption to current central government expenditure (excluding interest
payments) was 61 percent for all countries. This ratio varies substantially across
countries depending on the level of development; it stands at 78 percent for
low-income countries, 64 percent for middle-income countries, and 36 percent
for high-income countries.1 A large component of government consumption is
the wage bill of government workers. Another way to view the effect of
consumption on instability is to think of the government using consumption to
transfer fiscal resources to the various groups in order to reduce the level of
discontent in society.
Empirically, it is found that higher fractionalization leads to higher govern-
ment consumption in a reduced form equation. In a simultaneous equations
estimation with government consumption and political instability treated as
endogenous, it is shown that the channel by which fractionalization affects
government consumption is via political instability. Higher fractionalization
leads to higher instability, while higher instability leads to higher government
consumption. In turn, higher government consumption leads to lower political
instability. Thus government consumption can indeed appease competing
groups and reduce the level of conflict in a society divided along ethnic and
religious lines.
The model presented in this paper is related to a number of strands that have
developed independently in the political economy literature. Most of the previous
work on political instability and fractionalization focuses on the impact of these
variables on economic growth, while the literature on the determinants of govern-
ment consumption has not incorporated these political economy aspects in any
systematic manner.
1Data are from the World Bank (1997). The classification of countries by level of development is
taken from this source.One framework that could predict a positive relationship between fractional-
ization and government consumption is the common pool model. In this case, the
government is inherently weak and each powerful group is able to extract
resources from it. Given that society is composed of multiple self-interested
groups who act noncooperatively, no single group has any incentive to constrain
its demand for resources. Velasco (1997) suggests the common pool model as a
reason for the perpetuation of fiscal deficits over time. Lane and Tornell (1996)
and Tornell and Lane (1998) develop this idea in the context of a neoclassical
growth model in which each group has common access to the capital stock. This
leads to not only overconsumption and hence lower growth, but also a voracity
effect in which groups actually increase more than proportionately their rate of
appropriation after a positive shock to output.
The model presented in this paper posits an alternative link between fraction-
alization and government consumption, one that involves a strong central govern-
ment strategically using government consumption to reduce the level of political
risk. A society divided along ethnic or religious lines is potentially unstable; this
channel has the advantage of making political instability endogenous.
There is a sizable body of literature on the negative effect of political insta-
bility on economic outcomes. Barro (1991, 1996) finds that political violence
leads to lower growth in a cross section of countries. Alesina and others (1996)
conclude that while instability leads to lower growth, there is no evidence that low
growth affects the propensity for government change. Possible reasons for this link
include the induced uncertainty and the disruption in market activities deriving
from the instability (see Perotti, 1996). The exact mechanism, however, by which
instability reduces growth remains unspecified. Another approach to measuring
political instability is to devise an index capturing the key elements of social and
political unrest. Alesina and Perotti (1996) take this approach, arguing that the
disorder created by this form of political instability adversely affects productivity
and the return to investment. This framework is adopted here and a similar index
of political instability is derived. 
In related work, Blomberg (1996) argues that the government can use defense
spending as a partial insurance against political instability; instability inhibits
growth while increased military expenditure decreases instability. As well as the
standard result that political instability reduces growth, the author also reports
significant results in the other direction: higher growth reduces the probability of
coups. The role of military expenditure in this model is similar to that of govern-
ment consumption in the present paper: the logic of Blomberg (1996) is that the
“stick” of military expenditure reduces instability. In this paper, the “carrot” of
nonmilitary government consumption reduces the instability that arises from the
existence of diverse groups in society.
I. Theoretical Model
The model presented here is an adaptation of the standard neoclassical one-sector
endogenous growth model in which a policymaker chooses an intertemporal path
for consumption subject to a capital accumulation equation. It is assumed that the
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single group, or a coalition of different groups. All that matters is that the govern-
ment does not represent every group in society. The most natural interpretation of
consumption in this context is to think of it as the quantity of publicly provided
goods2 provided by the government at any point in time.
The government derives utility from rents; this can be thought of as consump-
tion allocated to the ruling group or as rents directly extracted from the economy’s
resources.3 The government’s welfare at time 0 is the present discounted value of
the sum of the instantaneous utility functions over time. Let private rents be
denoted by xt and let the instantaneous utility function be u(xt); for tractability, it
is assumed to be of the CRRA form so that:
(1)
where σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Since the government is selfish, in the sense that it is concerned purely with
the welfare of its members, it faces some probability of being overthrown. This
may take the form of a democratic loss of office or an extraconstitutional seizure
of power. The probability of losing power is associated directly with the degree of
political instability in the country. This political dimension can be added to the
neoclassical growth model in an intuitive manner. Assume that the government has
a constant positive subjective discount rate θ . Following Blomberg (1996), a
second component will be added to the discount rate, one that reflects the possi-
bility of the government losing power.
More specifically, assume that the government faces a stochastic process of
overthrow, π , which is constant per unit time. If π is assumed to be constant at each
point in time then the introduction of this sort of uncertainty has the effect of
raising the discount rate by π . The instability generated by the constant probability
of overthrow means that the government becomes more impatient. Rather than
treat it as an exogenous variable, it is assumed that the government can influence
π through its consumption choices and that the probability of overthrow is directly
related to the proportion of total consumption appropriated as rents by the ruling
cadre. Hence the government must choose the optimal path of rents xt and govern-
ment consumption ct knowing that this choice will directly affect the probability
of remaining in power that period. Formally,
















2We can think either of public goods or publicly provided private goods; it makes no difference in the
context of this model. For tractability, private consumption is ignored.
3One clear example of the latter would be funds deposited directly into the bank account of a klepto-
cratic leader.The intuition is straightforward: the excluded groups in society dislike the fact
that the ruling cadre is deriving rents as opposed to providing consumption goods
to benefit the populace as a whole. Satisfaction with the government in this model
depends on the composition of government spending, rather than the total, or ratio
relative to GDP, as agents view the government solely in terms of the proportion
of total spending seized by the ruling cadre.4 The level of government consump-
tion can be interpreted as insurance against political instability and the ensuing
probability of overthrow in the sense that it is possible to placate the excluded
groups with government consumption.5
To complete the model, the equations of motion must be characterized. On the
technological side, an AK model is assumed in which output (yt) is linear in a
single factor, capital (kt), and A represents the level of technology, so that:
(3)
As always, the capital stock is a state variable and the government must decide
how to allocate output between government consumption, investment, and rent-
seeking. The accumulation equation can be written as:
(4)
There is a second state variable in this model, which shall be called “political
capital”; it is defined as the accumulated probability of being in power at time t,
pt. From the assumptions made about π , pt can be written as follows:
(5)
Furthermore,
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4This differs somewhat from Blomberg (1996), who uses the ratio to GDP. The present model is only
concerned with the current flow of utility to the government and private agents, rather than investment.
5McGuire and Olson (1996) argue along similar lines, claiming that even if a ruler is concerned only
with personal rents, she has an incentive to provide public goods. In the authors’model, public goods are
required to produce productive private goods, which in turn yield valuable revenues to the ruler.Just as the government must choose between consuming or investing in phys-
ical capital, so it faces an intertemporal trade-off between extracting rents and
building up political capital. The optimization problem is one involving two
control variables and two state variables and can be written succinctly as
(7)
subject to k0 > 0, (4), and (6). In solving this problem, the two control variables
are redefined as zt and wt where wt ≡ ct +  xt. The government chooses the total
level of consumption and the allocation between rents and public goods. Note that
(7) has an intuitive interpretation: the government maximizes the expected utility
of rents at each future time period, where the expected value depends on the prob-
ability of being in power at each future date. The political preferences have the
effect of turning the problem into one with an endogenous discount rate.6
The following first-order conditions can therefore be derived, where λ t and µ t
are the co-state variables for physical and political capital respectively.7 The
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6There is a large body of literature on endogenous discount rates, beginning with Uzawa (1968).
Obstfeld (1990) works out a complete model for the case of one control variable. The model is also similar
in nature to the endogenous fertility models of Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989).
7A technical appendix, providing a detailed derivation of the steady-state plus an analysis of transi-
tional dynamics, is available upon request from the author.(12)
(13)
For this problem to give a meaningful solution, the following restriction must
be imposed on the utility function:
(14)
Given the particular utility function specified in (1), the condition that σ < 1
needs to be imposed.8 Equations (8) and (10) can be used to derive the growth rate
of rents and consumption in this economy. First, the condition that γ z = 0 is
imposed; since π must be constant in steady-state, the growth rate of zt must be
zero. This has the implication that consumption and rents grow at the same rate;
namely, γ w = γ x = γ c. Noting that γ p = –π in steady-state, it follows that the
common growth rate can be written as follows:
(15)
This is the standard solution for an AK model; it implies that the growth rate
of consumption (either private rents or general government consumption) is inde-
pendent of the level of capital (see Barro and Sala-ì-Martin, 1995). This equation
can be rearranged in the following way:
(16)
The left-hand side represents the return to investment while the right-hand
side represents the return to consumption. Given that π > 0 this implies that the
return to consumption exceeds the return under the modified golden rule. The intu-
A c =+ + π σγ θ .
γγ σ θ cx A == − + π ( ) []
1
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8A particular feature of models with endogenous discount rates is that since the level of utility appears
in the first-order conditions, the utility function must be constrained to be positive. A negative utility func-
tion in this framework would have the effect of placing negative weight on the future, thus leading the
government to set z = 1 today. A technical appendix (available upon request from the author) shows that
for σ > 1 the expected utility of setting z = 1 and seizing everything always exceeds the steady-state
expected utility.ition is straightforward: the possibility of overthrow biases the government’s
choice toward present consumption instead of investment. This leads to a
Pareto-inefficient outcome.9
The levels solution shall now be derived. Manipulating equations (9) and (11)
yields the following statement about the steady-state value of z:
(17)
Given the assumption that σ < 1, the right-hand side of (17) is always positive.
Finally, the growth rate of capital can be written as follows:
(18)
Given that the growth rate of consumption (rents) does not depend on the level
of capital, it is possible to describe consumption (rents) at time t as a function of
initial consumption (rents). It is straightforward to show that this implies a propor-
tional relationship between consumption (rents) and capital. If not, φ would not be
constant in steady-state. Applying this result, and  appealing to the linear produc-
tion function in (3), it is clear that γ x = γ c = γ w = γ k = γ y.
Setting γ x = γ k, the equilibrium level of φ can be solved for as follows:
(19)
The solution can now be fully characterized by equations (17) and (19).
Equation (17) allows for the retrieval of the equilibrium value of zt and plugging
this into (19) gives φ t.10
To derive clearer results, a functional form on π (zt) needs to be imposed; in
line with Blomberg (1996), the following linear specification is assumed:11
(20)
The steady-state values of the main variables can be written as follows:
π ( ) =+ zz tt αβ .
φ σ θ
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9Blomberg (1996) derives the same result in his model.
10This is the only possible solution to this dynamic model. All other paths can be ruled out either by
the fact that they hit a boundary or by a violation of the transversality condition.




The optimal response of these variables to an exogenous increase in the prob-
ability of overthrow, defined here as an increase in α or β , will now be considered.
In terms of the effects of an exogenous increase in the risk of overthrow on the
government’s choice of zt, there are two possibilities, depending on the prefer-
ences of the government. It either could respond by decreasing the level of zt in an
attempt to buy insurance against the increased political instability or it could
decide that, given that it faces a higher probability for being ousted from power, it
should seize more rents today.
The comparative statics for a change in β are particularly straightforward to
analyze:
(25)
This is because β zt is a positive constant so an increase in β will necessarily
be associated with a decrease in zt, leaving π t unchanged. This has the property
that π t will always remain constant when β changes. Total consumption in the
economy is unchanged: the only effect is a shift in the composition of wt from
rents to government consumption. The reduction in zt is such that it completely
counteracts the effect of the higher β and hence π is unchanged. This also ensures
that there is no change in the growth rate.
The effect of an increase in the constant term, α , is more ambiguous. We can
























































































569The signs of the above derivatives will depend on whether σ is greater or less
than one half. If 0 < σ <  1/2 then δ z*/δα < 0, δφ */δα < 0, δπ */δα < 0, and
δγ /δα > 0. In this case, the government reacts to an exogenous increase in α by
reducing both zt and wt; this reduces the probability of overthrow and actually
increases growth in the economy. If, on the other hand, 1/2 <  σ < 1 then
δ z*/δα >0 ,δφ */δα > 0, δπ */δα > 0, and δγ /δα < 0. Here, the government is
deciding to increase appropriation of rents. Total consumption is increasing, as is
the probability of overthrow. Hence, growth is lower in this scenario. The govern-
ment, responding to the higher exogenous probability of overthrow, responds by
choosing present consumption at the expense of investment.
It is possible to view the effect of an increase in the number of excluded
groups through the comparative static exercise of an increase in α or β . The idea
is that a more fractionalized country is exogenously more unstable. One way to
model a more fractionalized country is through a higher α ; holding everything else
constant, a higher degree of fractionalization (more excluded groups in the
economy) leads directly to higher political instability and hence a higher proba-
bility of overthrow. It is also possible to model an increase in fractionalization as
an increase in β ; the intuition here is that it is harder in terms of political capital
to appropriate a fixed proportion of total consumption as rents in more fractional-
ized countries. In other words, the marginal cost of appropriating rents is greater
in more fractionalized societies. A corollary is that the marginal benefit of
“bribing” or “buying insurance” using government consumption is higher in more
fractionalized countries.12 There is no single way to model fractionalization; this
approach has the advantage of simplicity and consistency with the model.
In terms of the empirical predictions of the model, the clearest results pertain
to the level of government consumption. At least for some parameter values, the
model predicts that higher levels of government consumption should be observed
in more fractionalized economies. In this model, higher fractionalization leads
directly to greater levels of political instability and this is compensated for by
higher levels of government consumption. This higher government consumption
in turn indirectly reduces political instability. No clear predictions emerge for
growth: if the β -mechanism is the channel of interest, then there should be no rela-
tionship between growth and fractionalization as the direct and indirect effects on
political instability cancel exactly. The empirical section of this paper will focus




12An alternative viewpoint is that, if a highly fractionalized country means each opposition group is
really weak, it may be that the political cost of appropriating rents will be decreasing in fractionalized
countries. Ultimately, it remains an empirical issue.II. Measuring Fractionalization and Political Instability
The Concept of Fractionalization
This paper uses a number of indices of fractionalization, measured along ethno-
linguistic and religious scales, as proxies for the number of competing groups in
society. One weakness of this approach is that such a measure cannot distinguish
between groups that are powerful and groups that are weak. This is the motivation
employed by Lane and Tornell (1996) for eschewing measures of fractionalization
as proxies for competing groups within society. In the present case, which focuses
on instability, such indices may indeed be reasonable proxies for the degree of
conflict within society. The intuition is that more fractionalized countries are
inherently more prone to instability, and this necessitates placation through higher
levels of government consumption.13 Of course, the indices will not measure the
“intensity of conflict” between groups and this will remain a fundamental weak-
ness.
The indices developed in this paper are defined as follows. For a given number
of groups in society, the index measures the probability that two randomly selected
individuals from the country in question will not belong to the same group.
Formally, it can be calculated from the following formula:
N is the total population and ni is the number of people belonging to the i-th group.
Specifically, two such indices will be defined, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and
religious fractionalization. The former divides the country into ethnolinguistic
groups while the latter concentrates on different religious groupings. Given data
availability, these seem to be reasonable proxies for measuring the importance,
though not the intensity, of group affiliation within each country. A further
problem is that these indices will have no time-variance, and the assumption that
they only change slowly over time will be maintained. This is important, because
the empirical section described in Section III will use panel data from three
decades.
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization
A number of researchers have worked with indices of ethnolinguistic fractional-

















13This is the motivation for postulating a positive relationship between fractionalization and the α and
β parameters in the previous section.Handbook of Political and Social Indicators by Taylor and Hudson (1972); this
index in turn is based on data from 1960 and was constructed in the Soviet Union
for the Atlas Narodiv Mira.14 Taylor and Hudson (1972) also consider two other
indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The second index was derived by
Muller (1964), in a comprehensive study of the world’s living languages. The third
of the indices has the fewest number of countries and derives from Roberts (1962),
from a study of second languages in Asia,Africa, and Latin America. Researchers
in economics have tended to use the Soviet index, given the larger sample size, and
the argument by Taylor and Hudson (1972) that the data are free from ideological
bias. Furthermore, Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that the other two measures
are flawed as they omit certain key groups within countries.
A number of papers in recent years have used the Soviet index to explore the
effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the overall macroeconomic environ-
ment. Canning and Fay (1993) argue that a more fractionalized population leads
to lower productivity growth. Easterly and Levine (1997) focus on low growth
rates in sub-Saharan Africa. They find that fractionalization of society along ethnic
lines is associated with low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped finan-
cial institutions, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits,
and poor institutional quality. They conclude that such results provide evidence of
strong rent-seeking behavior and inability to find consensus on the provision of
public goods in highly fractionalized economies. Controlling for other variables,
Sala-ì-Martin (1997) argues that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is not robustly
correlated with growth. In related work, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999)
address the issue of ethnic fractionalization and the provision of local public goods
in U.S. cities, counties, and metropolitan areas. They conclude that more ethni-
cally diverse regions are associated with higher spending and deficits per capita,
but with lower spending shares on basic public goods like education. Along
similar lines, Kuijs (2000) presents international evidence that more divided soci-
eties spend less on public goods.
This paper starts afresh and builds a new index of ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization. The source of the data is the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett,
1982), which provides an extremely detailed breakdown of the ethnolinguistic
groups within each country. It also has the advantage of coming from the same
source as the data on religious fractionalization. The methodology is simply to
include as many groups as possible at the most detailed level of breakdown. The
larger the number of groups in a country, the higher the value of the resulting
index. If 100 percent coverage can be achieved with the most detailed breakdown
of  ethnolinguistic groupings, this is the methodology adopted. Otherwise, a more
aggregated group is taken.15
This new index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Table 1) has a number of
advantages over the previous indices, including the care taken to include as many
groups as possible, the more recent data, and the larger sample size.16 In contrast,
Anthony Annett
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14Moscow: The N.N. Miklukho-Maklaya Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of  Sciences,
Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR, 1964.
15Actually, this rarely arose as a significant problem, given the highly detailed level of the data.
16The values of this index for 150 countries are available on request from the author.SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
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Table 1. An Index of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization
Tanzania 0.95 Brazil 0.64 Algeria 0.30
Uganda 0.93 Qatar 0.64 Luxembourg 0.30
Zambia 0.91 Guyana 0.63 Burundi 0.29
India 0.90 Mauritania 0.63 Romania 0.29
Kenya 0.90 Thailand 0.63 Israel 0.29
Liberia 0.89 Bhutan 0.62 Uruguay 0.26
Nigeria 0.89 Laos 0.61 Honduras 0.25
South Africa 0.88 Pakistan 0.61 Egypt 0.25
Madagascar 0.87 Panama 0.60 Costa Rica 0.24
Côte d’Ivoire 0.87 China 0.60 Oman 0.24
Benin 0.87 Mexico 0.59 Rwanda 0.22
Mali 0.86 United States 0.58 Syria 0.21
Malawi 0.84 Belize 0.58 Dominica 0.20
Philippines 0.84 Switzerland 0.56 Western Samoa 0.20
Mozambique 0.84 Fiji 0.56 Barbados 0.20
Gabon 0.83 Belgium 0.54 New Zealand 0.20
Guinea-Bissau 0.83 Grenada 0.54 Sweden 0.19
Cameroon 0.82 St. Lucia 0.54 Lesotho 0.19
Senegal 0.81 Venezuela 0.54 Turkey 0.19
Angola 0.80 Zimbabwe 0.53 Swaziland 0.18
Zaïre 0.80 Mongolia 0.53 St. Kitts 0.18
Indonesia 0.79 St. Vincent 0.53 Paraguay 0.17
Sierra Leone 0.79 Czechoslovakia 0.52 Reunion 0.17
Central African Rep. 0.79 Guatemala 0.52 Hungary 0.17
Chad 0.78 Jordan 0.52 Vanuatu 0.16
Yugoslavia 0.78 Nicaragua 0.50 Finland 0.15
Namibia 0.78 Botswana 0.48 El Salvador 0.15
Canada 0.77 Mauritius 0.48 Solomon Islands 0.14
Guinea 0.77 Cape Verde 0.48 Yemen 0.14
Ethiopia 0.76 Morocco 0.47 Austria 0.13
Burkina Faso 0.76 Myanmar 0.47 Germany 0.12
Iran 0.76 Dominican Rep. 0.46 Netherlands 0.11
Djibouti 0.73 Bahamas 0.44 Haiti 0.10
Togo 0.73 Puerto Rico 0.44 Greece 0.10
Ghana 0.73 Spain 0.44 Tunisia 0.09
Kuwait 0.73 Chile 0.43 Seychelles 0.08
Suriname 0.73 Singapore 0.42 Malta 0.08
Gambia 0.73 Argentina 0.41 Italy 0.08
Congo 0.72 Iraq 0.39 Ireland 0.07
Niger 0.72 United Kingdom 0.39 Bangladesh 0.07
Sudan 0.71 Somalia 0.39 Comoros 0.06
Sri Lanka 0.71 Bahrain 0.38 Saudi Arabia 0.06
Bolivia 0.71 Cyprus 0.36 Poland 0.05
Malaysia 0.70 Jamaica 0.35 Denmark 0.05
U.S.S.R. 0.69 Papua New Guinea 0.35 Norway 0.05
Nepal 0.68 United Arab Emirates 0.34 Tonga 0.03
Colombia 0.67 Hong Kong 0.33 Japan 0.03
Trinidad and Tobago 0.66 France 0.33 Iceland 0.03
Peru 0.66 Australia 0.32 Portugal 0.01
Ecuador 0.66 Bulgaria 0.31 Korea 0.00
Source: Author’s calculations based on Barrett (1982).the Soviet measure has data for only 119 countries in this sample. The other
indices are even worse: the Muller index contains 102 countries in the sample,
while the Roberts index reports only 47. From this point, the Soviet, Muller, and
Roberts indices shall be denoted Index 1, Index 2, and Index 3, respectively. The
correlation between the present index and the Taylor-Hudson indices are as
follows: 0.84 for Index 1, 0.66 for Index 2, and 0.85 for Index 3. For the sake of
comparison, the correlation between Index 1 and Index 2 is 0.83, and the correla-
tion between Index 2 and Index 3 is 0.93.
Religious Fractionalization
Apparently, there has been no attempt in the literature to develop an index of reli-
gious fractionalization with a view to analyzing its impact on macroeconomic
variables.17 The index of religious fractionalization used in this paper (Table 2),
simply measures the probability that two randomly drawn people in a specific
country will not belong to the same religious group, and hence measures the
degree of fractionalization in society along a different dimension. Once again, the
data used in compiling this index comes from the World Christian Encyclopedia
(Barrett, 1982) and all the information pertains to the early 1980s.18 Any religion
listed by Barrett (1982) as a distinct religion in a given country is included in the
index. The only religion that is disaggregated is Christianity: the subdivisions
include Catholicism,19 Protestantism,20 Eastern Orthodoxy, Indigenous
Christianity,21 and Crypto-Christians.22 Other groupings include Islam, Hinduism,
Buddhism, Judaism, Tribal religions, Shintoism, Chinese folk religion, as well as
a plethora of smaller religions. Furthermore two secular categories are included:
Nonreligious and Atheist. The data for the latter normally derives from member-
ship of communist parties in the country in question.
The mean value of the religious fractionalization index is 0.38. The simple
correlation of the indices of ethnic and religious fractionalization yields a coeffi-
cient of 0.39, suggesting a positive relationship between the indices but also
confirming that each index captures a different dimension to the fractionalization
within each country.
For the sake of comparison, and to assess robustness, a supplementary index
of religious fractionalization called Index 4 has been compiled. The data used is
from a different source23 and at a much less disaggregated level. Only ten cate-
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17Some work has been done on the impact of religious affiliation and the size and efficiency of
government. La Porta and others (1998) analyze the effect of religious affiliation and size and quality of
government. The present study emphasizes religious division and does not consider the potential effects
of religious affiliation.
18Barro (1999) argues that the data do not significantly change over time.
19Includes non-Roman Catholics.
20Includes all Protestant denominations.
21Usually associated with African and Caribbean countries.
22This group is a residual, and estimate of the number of clandestine Christians in countries that do
not grant religious freedom. It is included in the index as a separate group, as there is no way (from the
data) of apportioning this group between the other denominations. It is only an issue in a small number
of countries, and may serve as a proxy for the enhanced religious tensions in these countries.
23The Encyclopedia Britannica Online.SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
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Table 2. An Index of Religious Fractionalization
Korea 0.83 Sierra Leone 0.58 Dominica 0.18
U.S.S.R. 0.79 Benin 0.56 Costa Rica 0.18
Ghana 0.79 Laos 0.55 Djibouti 0.17
Kenya 0.79 Tonga 0.54 Senegal 0.17
Yugoslavia 0.77 Uruguay 0.54 Puerto Rico 0.16
Cameroon 0.75 Switzerland 0.52 Argentina 0.16
Malawi 0.75 Gabon 0.52 Thailand 0.15
Bulgaria 0.75 Sri Lanka 0.52 Qatar 0.14
Tanzania 0.74 Namibia 0.49 Bolivia 0.14
Guyana 0.72 Sweden 0.49 Jordan 0.13
Hong Kong 0.72 Papua New Guinea 0.48 Luxembourg 0.13
Swaziland 0.72 Belize 0.48 Finland 0.13
Zimbabwe 0.72 Vanuatu 0.48 Guatemala 0.11
Zambia 0.72 Angola 0.48 Portugal 0.11
Trinidad and Tobago 0.71 Grenada 0.47 Mexico 0.10
Suriname 0.71 Jamaica 0.47 Nicaragua 0.10
Liberia 0.71 New Zealand 0.46 Venezuela 0.10
Côte d’Ivoire 0.71 Bhutan 0.45 United Arab Emirates 0.10
South Africa 0.70 Bahamas 0.45 Bahrain 0.10
Nigeria 0.70 United Kingdom 0.44 Kuwait 0.09
Chad 0.70 Guinea 0.44 Peru 0.09
Malaysia 0.68 Sudan 0.44 Denmark 0.09
United States 0.68 France 0.39 Ireland 0.09
Indonesia 0.68 Cyprus 0.38 Iraq 0.08
Togo 0.67 St. Vincent 0.37 Honduras 0.08
Singapore 0.66 Western Samoa 0.37 Cape Verde 0.08
Mongolia 0.66 India 0.36 Paraguay 0.08
Mauritius 0.66 Burundi 0.36 El Salvador 0.07
Madagascar 0.66 Poland 0.33 Reunion 0.07
Fiji 0.65 Mali 0.33 Ecuador 0.07
Uganda 0.65 Chile 0.32 Colombia 0.07
Botswana 0.65 Egypt 0.31 Iceland 0.07
Zaïre 0.65 Barbados 0.30 Dominican Rep. 0.07
Mozambique 0.65 Haiti 0.30 Pakistan 0.06
Czechoslovakia 0.64 Italy 0.29 Spain 0.06
Hungary 0.64 Philippines 0.29 Greece 0.05
Australia 0.63 Panama 0.27 Iran 0.04
Lesotho 0.63 Gambia 0.27 Norway 0.04
Congo 0.62 Bangladesh 0.25 Saudi Arabia 0.02
Central African Rep. 0.62 Myanmar 0.24 Oman 0.02
Netherlands 0.62 Brazil 0.22 Algeria 0.02
Rwanda 0.62 Niger 0.21 Turkey 0.02
Ethiopia 0.61 Israel 0.21 Tunisia 0.01
Burkina Faso 0.61 St. Lucia 0.21 Morocco 0.01
Canada 0.61 St. Kitts 0.21 Mauritania 0.01
China 0.59 Austria 0.20 Yemen 0.01
Japan 0.58 Seychelles 0.20 Comoros 0.01
Guinea-Bissau 0.58 Syria 0.19 Somalia 0.00
Romania 0.58 Nepal 0.19
Germany 0.58 Belgium 0.19
Source: Author’s calculations based on Barrett (1982).gories are included: Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam,
Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, African indigenous, Chinese folk, and Official
Atheism. The raw correlation between the two indices of religious fractionaliza-
tion is 0.89.
Since religious and ethnic fractionalization represent two dimensions to the
divisions within society, it makes sense to combine them (Table 3). Hence the
index of fractionalization is defined as one half times the value of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization plus one half times the value of religious fractionalization: this
index will be the principle proxy for conflict between competing groups in this
paper.24 From now on, the term fractionalization shall be taken to mean this
combined index.
Political Instability
There are a number of different approaches to the quantification of political insta-
bility. Unlike Londregan and Poole (1990), Blomberg (1996), and Alesina and
others (1996), instability in this paper is not equated with the propensity of
observing changes in government. Rather, the second approach is adopted and an
index of political unrest is devised. Following other researchers in the area, a
single index of political instability encompassing a number of different factors is
created (Table 4). This is precisely the methodology employed by researchers such
as Hibbs (1973), Vanieris and Gupta (1986), Gupta (1990), Alesina and Perotti
(1996), and Perotti  (1996).
The idea is that these factors capture different dimensions of political instability
in the country. The following nine dimensions are employed: (1) genocidal incidents
involving communal victims or mixed communal and political victims (COMPOL),
measured as a dummy variable; (2) the occurrence of a civil war, measured as a
dummy variable (WARCIV); (3) the number of assassinations per thousand popula-
tion (ASSASS); (4) the number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top
government elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power structure
(COUPS); (5) the number of illegal or forced changes in the top government elite,
any attempt at such change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose
aim is independence from the central government (REVOLS); (6) violent demon-
strations or clashes involving more than a hundred citizens involving the use of phys-
ical force (RIOTS); (7) the number of major government crises, where a crisis is
defined as any rapidly developing situation threatening to bring the downfall of the
present regime, excluding instances of revolt aimed at overthrow (CRIS); (8) the
number of times in a year that a new premier is named and/or 50 percent of the
cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers (CABCHG); and (9) the number of
basic alterations in a state’s constitutional structure, the extreme case being the adop-
tion of a new constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the various
branches of government (CONSTCHG).25
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148 countries are available upon request from the author.
25These variables, including the definitions, are taken directly from the dataset of Easterly and
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Table 3. An Index of Ethnolinguistic and Religious Fractionalization
Tanzania 0.85 Switzerland 0.54 Vanuatu 0.32
Kenya 0.84 Bhutan 0.54 Guatemala 0.32
Zambia 0.82 Belize 0.54 Japan 0.31
Liberia 0.80 Bulgaria 0.53 Puerto Rico 0.30
Malawi 0.79 Hong Kong 0.53 Nicaragua 0.30
Uganda 0.79 Grenada 0.52 Tonga 0.29
Nigeria 0.79 Gambia 0.51 Western Samoa 0.28
Côte d’Ivoire 0.79 Senegal 0.50 Argentina 0.28
South Africa 0.79 Australia 0.49 Egypt 0.28
Cameroon 0.78 Niger 0.47 Cape Verde 0.28
Yugoslavia 0.78 Djibouti 0.47 Dominican Rep. 0.26
Madagascar 0.77 St. Vincent 0.45 Barbados 0.25
Ghana 0.76 Swaziland 0.45 Israel 0.25
Mozambique 0.74 Bahamas 0.44 Spain 0.25
U.S.S.R. 0.74 Panama 0.44 Morocco 0.24
Chad 0.74 Nepal 0.44 Bahrain 0.24
Indonesia 0.74 Brazil 0.43 Iraq 0.24
Zaïre 0.73 Romania 0.43 United Arab Emirates 0.22
Suriname 0.72 Bolivia 0.43 Luxembourg 0.22
Benin 0.72 Rwanda 0.42 Costa Rica 0.21
Central African Rep. 0.71 Papua New Guinea 0.42 Haiti 0.20
Guinea-Bissau 0.71 Korea 0.42 Syria 0.20
Togo 0.70 United Kingdom 0.41 Somalia 0.19
Malaysia 0.69 Kuwait 0.41 St. Kitts 0.19
Trinidad and Tobago 0.69 Jamaica 0.41 Dominica 0.19
Ethiopia 0.69 Lesotho 0.41 Poland 0.19
Canada 0.69 Hungary 0.41 Italy 0.18
Sierra Leone 0.68 Iran 0.40 Honduras 0.17
Burkina Faso 0.68 Uruguay 0.40 Austria 0.16
Guyana 0.68 Qatar 0.39 Algeria 0.16
Gabon 0.68 Thailand 0.39 Bangladesh 0.16
Congo 0.67 Peru 0.38 Finland 0.14
Angola 0.64 St. Lucia 0.38 Seychelles 0.14
Namibia 0.64 Chile 0.37 Oman 0.13
United States 0.63 Colombia 0.37 Paraguay 0.13
India 0.63 Cyprus 0.37 Reunion 0.12
Zimbabwe 0.63 Netherlands 0.37 El Salvador 0.11
Sri Lanka 0.61 Belgium 0.37 Turkey 0.10
Fiji 0.61 Ecuador 0.36 Ireland 0.08
Guinea 0.60 France 0.36 Greece 0.07
Mongolia 0.60 Myanmar 0.36 Yemen 0.07
China 0.59 Germany 0.35 Denmark 0.07
Mali 0.59 Mexico 0.35 Portugal 0.06
Czechoslovakia 0.58 Sweden 0.34 Tunisia 0.05
Laos 0.58 Pakistan 0.34 Iceland 0.05
Sudan 0.57 New Zealand 0.33 Norway 0.04
Mauritius 0.57 Burundi 0.32 Saudi Arabia 0.04
Botswana 0.57 Jordan 0.32 Comoros 0.03
Philippines 0.56 Mauritania 0.32
Singapore 0.54 Venezuela 0.32
Source: Author’s calculations based on Barrett (1982).These factors measure political instability along a number of different dimen-
sions, all threatening the survival of the present government in some way. From
the point of view of the model, it is necessary to develop an index of political insta-
bility that directly captures those aspects of social disruption that will lead the
government to trade off private rents in order to devote resources toward the alle-
viation of this instability. The statistical methodology employed in deriving such




Table 4. An Index of Political Instability
(averaged across three decades)
Guatemala 1.4802 Peru 0.2767 Honduras 0.0367
Uganda 1.3300 Côte d’Ivoire 0.2500 Mauritania 0.0367
Indonesia 1.2900 Uruguay 0.2467 New Zealand 0.0367
Sudan 1.2633 Ghana 0.2467 Rwanda 0.0350
Burundi 1.1800 Canada 0.2333 Sweden 0.0333
South Africa 0.9900 Malaysia 0.2333 SLE 0.0300
India 0.8733 Spain 0.2300 Togo 0.0300
Nigeria 0.8567 Jordan 0.1967 Greece 0.0267
Zimbabwe 0.8100 France 0.1867 Switzerland 0.0233
Turkey 0.7867 Tunisia 0.1767 Australia 0.0200
Mozambique 0.6900 Ireland 0.1667 Senegal 0.0133
Syria 0.6750 Trinidad-Tobago 0.1450 Central African Rep. 0.0133
Ethiopia 0.6733 Lesotho 0.1400 Cameroon 0.0133
Korea 0.6567 Morocco 0.1267 Dominican Rep. 0.0100
Zaïre 0.6200 Austria 0.1233 Gabon 0.0100
Angola 0.6200 Ecuador 0.1167 Papua New Guinea 0.0100
Philippines 0.6133 Belgium 0.1167 Japan 0.0067
Colombia 0.6100 Thailand 0.1067 Iceland 0.0067
El Salvador  0.5702 United States 0.1033 Niger 0.0067
Bolivia 0.5600 Guinea-Bissau 0.1000 Malawi 0.0050
Argentina 0.5434 Suriname 0.1000 Kenya 0.0050
Pakistan 0.5267 United Kingdom 0.0900 Fiji 0.0050
Chile 0.5067 Portugal 0.0900 Gambia 0.0050
Afghanistan 0.4867 Panama 0.0834 Madagascar 0.0050
Sri Lanka  0.4533 Mali 0.0767 Costa Rica 0.0033
Liberia 0.4500 Nepal 0.0767 Denmark 0.0000
Nicaragua 0.4434 Benin 0.0650 Norway 0.0000
Venezuela 0.4333 Finland 0.0633 Bangladesh 0.0000
Somalia 0.4300 Tanzania 0.0550 Barbados 0.0000
Paraguay 0.4133 Haiti 0.0500 Botswana 0.0000
Italy 0.4033 Guyana 0.0452 Algeria 0.0000
Jamaica 0.4000 Congo 0.0450 Luxembourg 0.0000
Brazil 0.3867 Cyprus 0.0434 Malta 0.0000
Israel 0.3633 Egypt 0.0433 Mauritius 0.0000
Yemen 0.3550 Mexico 0.0433 Singapore 0.0000
Chad 0.2767 Zambia 0.0400 Swaziland 0.0000
Source: Author’s calculations based on Easterly and Levine (1996).INS = 0.61 * WARCIV + 0.57 * COMPOL + 0.29 * ASSASS
+ 0.10 * CRIS + 0.07 * REVOLS + 0.06 * RIOTS + 0.01 * COUPS
+ 0.01 * CABCHG + 0.01 * CONSTCHG
The factor analysis technique is designed to reduce the dimensionality of a vari-
able by describing linear combinations of those variables that contain most of the
information. In essence, the technique recovers the latent original variable by iden-
tifying a small number of common factors that linearly reconstruct the original
variables. Vanieris and Gupta (1986) claim that there is “general agreement among
students of the relevant literature” that there are two dimensions to political insta-
bility that can be disentangled by factor analysis. These dimensions represent the
less and more violent events, the former placing weight on such variables as riots
and demonstrations, the latter emphasizing those elements that result in deaths.
Hibbs (1973) dubbed these factors “collective protest” and “internal war,” respec-
tively. This is indeed the pattern found with the data in question: the instability
variable here reflects the more violent “internal war” factor. In this sense, the
index should be interpreted primarily as one representing political violence.
One advantage of INS is that, unlike previous indices, it is timevarying with
average decade values for the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Data availability
constrains the series to include only 108 countries.26
III. Empirical Results
Econometric Methodology
The goal of this section is to explore the data for evidence in favor of the hypoth-
esis forwarded in Section II using data on fractionalization, instability, and govern-
ment consumption. Pooled time-series cross-section data will be used, with three
time observations corresponding to the decade averages for the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s. The ten-year average is used to remove any short-term cyclical patterns in
government consumption. To allow for decade-specific effects, decade dummies
are included in each equation. The following sequence is adopted: first,
single-equation estimation for government consumption is presented to ascertain
the importance of fractionalization. Following from this, systems estimation tech-
niques are utilized, treating both government consumption and political instability
as endogenous.
The model of Section I argues that the government appropriates rents directly
to benefit its own group and provides government consumption to the benefit of
excluded groups. It is implicitly assumed that rents take the form of a direct
transfer and do not show up in government consumption. Clearly, it may be the
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26Values for this index are available upon request from the author.case that some rents are included within government consumption. Unfortunately,
this is impossible to disentangle empirically. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to
posit that the bulk of government consumption benefits a larger group of citizens
than the government faction alone.27 In an empirical study, Rodrik (1997b) finds
no effect of resource rents on government consumption, and concludes that
government consumption (in particular public employment) is driven more by
social insurance considerations.28
Government Consumption Equations
For most of the equations, the dependent variable employed will be the real share
of nonmilitary government consumption to GDP. This is measured as the share of
government consumption in GDP, measured in 1985 international prices from the
Heston-Summers data set29 minus the ratio of government expenditure on defense
(deflated by the investment price)30 to real GDP from the Barro-Lee data set.31The
reason for excluding military spending is straightforward: one may postulate that
military expenditure is higher in more unstable countries, for reasons not
accounted for by the model. There are a number of reasons for choosing to work
with the Heston-Summers data. Most of the previous work in recent years on the
determinants of government consumption has utilized this data source. A number
of researchers, such as Ram (1987) and Rodrik (1996) maintain that the
Heston-Summers data is superior to the more conventional data on government
shares for the problem at hand given that the conventional data suffer from prob-
lems created by the differing relative price of government purchases across coun-
tries. Without making this adjustment, the actual size of government in poorer
countries is biased downward.
Table 5 estimates a number of basic government consumption equations. It is
necessary to produce a number of control variables: these will be the variables
considered important in previous work in the field. There is a burgeoning litera-
ture in recent years on the determinants of the size of government; most of this
work has focused on the importance of economic and demographic variables.32
The equations in Table 5, as will be the case with all equations in this paper,
include decade dummies. To be able to compare these results with the results of
the structural equations in the next section, the sample size is constrained to the
108 countries for which data are available on political instability.
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27If the data were available, it would be possible to test compositional effects, along the lines of
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999).
28Rodrik deals with economic, not political, risk.
29Penn World Tables 5.6.
30The investment deflator is chosen to convert military spending to international prices on the basis
that investment and military spending probably involve fairly similar imported goods.
31This is exactly the way that Barro (1991, 1996) nets defense spending out of government consump-
tion in order to measure that component of government consumption that does not enhance productivity
(to this end he also excludes expenditure on education).
32See, for example, Tait and Heller (1982), Ram (1987), Lindauer (1988), Heller and Diamond
(1990), Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), Rodrik (1995, 1996), Commander, Davoodi, and Lee (1997),
and Alesina and Wacziarg (1997).In terms of control variables, the age dependency ratio is one of the most
common demographic variables in the literature, based on the idea that a higher
proportion of young and old people in the population leads to greater demand for
publicly provided services, especially health care and education. A higher rate of
urbanization is postulated to lead to a higher demand for government services.
Adding a political economy dimension, it is plausible to argue that the government
is likely to favor the urban over the rural community. Alesina and Spolaore (1997)
argue that there are economies of scale in the provision of public goods.
Population is included as a proxy for country size; this variable is significant in
Alesina and Wacziarg (1997).
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Table 5. OLS Government Consumption Equations1
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Africa dummy –5.48 –4.03 –5.15 –5.64 –7.20
(–2.78) (–2.25) (–2.75) (–2.73) (–3.18)
Latin America dummy –5.21 –5.07 –4.96 –5.70 –6.78
(–4.80) (–4.53) (–4.65) (–5.13) (–5.65)
East Asia dummy –9.60 –8.39 –9.51 –9.84 –9.09
(–5.98) (–5.81) (–6.09) (–5.60) (–5.43)
Log GDP per capita –4.15 –4.78 –4.60 –4.91 –5.74 –6.01
(–6.29) (–6.09) (–6.04) (–6.11) (–5.96) (–6.26)
Age-dependency ratio –1.18 2.59 1.85 3.36 3.03 3.30
(–0.31) (0.79) (0.56) (1.01) (0.92) (1.05)
Openness 0.008 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 –0.004
(0.31) (1.06) (0.95) (1.00) (1.00) (–0.12)
St. Dev. of terms of trade –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.19 –0.19 –0.19
(–1.57) (–1.97) (–1.99) (–1.87) (–1.84) (–1.94)
External risk 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.70) (2.05) (2.13) (2.04) (2.06) (2.04)
Fractionalization 1.54 5.84 5.42 7.53





Urbanization rate 0.05 0.06
(1.26) (1.65)




R2 0.35 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46
N 262 262 264 262 257 257
1Robust standard errors used; t-statistics in parentheses. Decade dummies included.In terms of economic variables, a lot of attention has been accorded to the role
of income per capita in explaining the size of government. One of the oldest
hypotheses in the literature is Wagner’s Law: this states that the demand for
government services is income elastic so a higher GDP per capita is expected to
lead to a higher share of government consumption in GDP. The reasoning behind
this is that either government consumption is a luxury good or the administrative
and regulatory costs increase with the level of economic development.
Cameron (1978) argued that more open economies were associated with larger
government as measured by the share of consumption in GDP. Rodrik (1995,
1996, 1997a) argues that the government sector insulates the economy from the
destabilizing effects of external shocks. According to this logic, countries with
higher exposure to external risk tend to have larger governments. Therefore the
positive coefficient on openness in a reduced form government consumption equa-
tion stems from the fact that more open economies are exposed to external risk,
and in these economies, the government uses its own consumption as a buffer
against this risk. Rodrik (1996) derives a theoretical measure of external risk,
which is defined as the degree of openness multiplied by the standard deviation of
terms of trade shocks: this is the definition of external risk in this paper.
Table 5 considers the significance of fractionalization, holding fixed the afore-
mentioned control variables. Equation 1 shows that fractionalization (the linear
average of the ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization indices) is positive
but completely insignificant when regional dummies are excluded.33 When the
three regional dummies are entered into the model, the results change dramati-
cally: in separate equations the point estimates on fractionalization, ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization are all positive and
significant.34 This is because there are significant regional patterns to both govern-
ment consumption and fractionalization and therefore the exclusion of these
regional effects may cause omitted variable bias in the fractionalization coeffi-
cients.35 For the remainder of the paper, regional dummies will be included in all
equations.
In terms of magnitude, increasing fractionalization by one standard deviation
leads to an increase in government consumption of 0.16 standard deviations:
given that the standard deviation of government consumption is 7.87, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in fractionalization will increase government consump-
tion by 1.29 percentage points.36 A one standard deviation in ethnolinguistic
fractionalization will increase government consumption by 0.09 standard devia-
tions; the equivalent number for religious fractionalization is 0.15. It can be
concluded, as predicted by the theoretical model, that higher levels of fractional-
ization lead to higher levels of government consumption. Furthermore, this result
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33The same is true for ethnolinguistic fractionalization and religious fractionalization.
34In unreported results, there is no evidence that military expenditure is higher in more fractional-
ized countries.
35The significance of fractionalization in affecting government consumption does not depend on the
inclusion on any single regional dummy.
36If government consumption is at its mean of 18.73 at the outset, then this implies a 7 percent
increase.holds up among both dimensions of fractionalization although the results, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, seem to be weaker for ethnolinguistic than for
religious fractionalization.
As for the control variables, the age-dependency ratio and openness are not
significant in any of the equations. Real income per capita is negative and strongly
significant in every equation: this conclusion is in line with Rodrik (1996), but in
violation of Wagner’s Law.37 The point estimate on the standard deviation of the
terms of trade is negative and significant while the measure of external risk is posi-
tive and significant as predicted by the hypothesis of Rodrik (1996). Equation 5
adds the urbanization rate and a socialist dummy38 to the basic specification;
neither is significant. In line with the results of Alesina and Wacziarg (1997), the
log of population enters with a negative sign, evidence of economies of scale in
the provision of public goods.39
In unreported results, a number of robustness tests have been conducted,
including sequentially dropping each country from the regression and using a
larger sample (including countries for which no data are available on political
instability). The basic results continue to hold. The same is true when the equa-
tions are estimated using random effects. In sum, it is clear from the reduced form
government consumption equations that higher fractionalization leads to higher
levels of government consumption. So far, this result is consistent with both the
common-pool model of weak government dominated by strong interest groups
and the model of Section II that emphasizes political instability as the key factor
which links fractionalization and government consumption. This mechanism will
now be explored in some detail.
Systems Estimation
From the model of Section II, the causality is expected to run as follows:
This section treats both government consumption and political instability as
endogenous variables.40 As a preliminary step in the systems estimation, OLS is
used to estimate equations for government consumption and political instability,
both with the other as an explanatory variable. The results can be seen in Table 6.
Fractionalization Instability Govt Consumption Instability ↑⇒ ↑⇒ ↑⇒ ↓ .
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37Wagner’s Law applies to the nominal, rather than the real, share of government consumption,
suggesting that it is driven more by rising relative government wages in advanced economies.
38This variable derives from Kornai (1992).
39Alesina and Wacziarg (1997) argue that the Rodrik results are spurious, based on the fact that there
is a strong negative correlation between openness and the size of a country. The external risk result,
however, is robust to the inclusion of the population variable.
40In related work,Alesina and others (1996) estimate a systems model in which economic growth and
political instability are both endogenous. Instability is defined as the propensity of government change.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) treat investment and instability as endogenous, where instability is defined as
an index of political unrest.Equations (1) and (2) of Table 6 estimate the familiar government consumption
model, with instability as a regressor. The coefficient is negative and significant.
All previous results hold up. The significance of instability is robust to the exclu-
sion of fractionalization.
Equation (3) of Table 6 uses OLS to estimate an equation with instability as
the dependent variable. The first question of interest is the importance of fraction-
alization in leading to political instability. As basic control variables, the log of
GDP per capita, the urbanization rate, and the socialist dummy are all included.
The literature on the determinants of political instability is not nearly as extensive
as it is for government consumption. Income per capita captures the idea that
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Africa dummy –2.98 –5.62 –0.31
(–1.91) (–2.90) (–3.03)
Latin America dummy –4.59 –5.03 –0.01
(–4.24) (–4.74) (–0.16)




Log GDP per capita –4.76 –4.86 –0.22
(–6.00) (–6.22) (–4.45)




Sd. Dev. of terms of trade –0.18 –0.17
(–1.79) (–1.86)






R2 0.44 0.45 0.17
N 264 262 264
1Robust standard errors used; t-statistic in parentheses. Decade dummies included.instability ultimately represents the dissatisfaction of the populace. Poorer coun-
tries, defined by those with lower real income per capita, should be more prone to
instability holding other factors constant. It is especially important to include this
variable to avoid picking up a spurious relationship between fractionalization and
instability, caused by the fact that poorer countries are more unstable, and poorer
countries are more fractionalized. Countries with higher rates of urbanization may
be expected to lead to more political pressures that may find a violent outlet, given
appropriate conditions.41 Finally, it may be the case that, holding standard of
living constant, the particular policies followed in socialist economies may lead to
more inherent instability. As with all equations, the regional and decade dummies
are included.
With these basic control variables alone, the coefficient on fractionalization
is positive and significant, suggesting that there is indeed a relationship
between fractionalization and instability.42 The coefficient on income per capita
is negative and highly significant, suggesting economic dissatisfaction is
indeed a principal source of political instability. The coefficients on the urban-
ization rate and the socialist dummy possess the anticipated signs, but are not
significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on government consumption
is negative and significant, suggesting that countries that devote more resources
to government consumption are associated with lower levels of political
instability.43
It can be concluded from the OLS results of Table 6 that there is a strong nega-
tive association between government consumption and instability. The exact
mechanism, however, remains to be determined. A priori, it is possible to make
causality arguments in both directions. It may be the case that political instability
(especially violent instability of the sort considered here) lessens the government’s
ability to collect tax revenue or borrow on international markets and this
constrains actual government consumption to be lower than desired. An alternative
hypothesis argues, in a Hobbesian manner, that the causality runs in the opposite
direction with lower levels of government consumption breeding discontent
among the populace which may erupt into violent political instability. The second
explanation, of course, is the one provided by the model of Section I.
An attempt to disentangle these effects will be made using Two Stage Least
Squares (TSLS), treating government consumption and instability as endogenous
variables. If this hypothesis is correct, then the estimates from Table 6 will suffer
from simultaneous equations bias. From the full set of exogenous variables, the
following variables are selected as instruments for government consumption: the
age-dependency ratio, openness, the standard deviation of terms of trade shocks,
and external risk (the interaction of openness with the standard deviation of terms
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41Ades and Glaeser (1995) postulate that the direction of causality runs from political instability to
urbanization.
42The results are not reported, but both ethnolinguistic fractionalization and religious fractionaliza-
tion are just as significant when entered independently.
43It is especially important to to remove military expenditure from government consumption in this
case. In unreported results, adding military spending as a percentage of GDP to this equation yields a coef-
ficient that is positive and significant.of trade shocks). Fractionalization, the urbanization rate, and the socialist dummy
are used to instrument for instability. Income per capita and the regional and
decade dummies are included in both equations. Basically, equations (1) and (3)
of Table 6 are being re-estimated using the technique of instrumental variables,
treating government consumption and instability as endogenous. This will allow
for testing the validity of the hypothesized feedback mechanism. 
It can be seen from Table 7 that the results are quite favorable. The key result
is that while the effect of government consumption on instability remains negative
and significant, the effect of instability on government consumption is now posi-
tive and significant.44 Furthermore, the point estimate on fractionalization in the
instability equation remains positive and significant. There is evidence, therefore,
that the hypothesized chain of events is indeed borne out by the data. Higher frac-
tionalization leads directly to higher instability. In response, government spending
rises and this has the consequent effect of leading to lower political instability.
Table 7 also reports the test statistics associated with the Chi-squared test of
overidentifying restrictions for each equation; this basically tests the relationship
between the instruments and the error term in the structural equation. The resulting
low statistics suggest that the instruments in each case are validly excluded.45
Confidence in this result must be tempered somewhat by the weakness of the
instruments for political instability. This system was also estimated by Three Stage
Least  Squares; the results are not reported here as they are virtually identical to
the TSLS results. 
Returning to the system estimated by equations (1) and (2), it is the case that
an increase in fractionalization by one standard deviation leads to an increase in
instability of 0.1144, which is 0.28 of a standard deviation. An increase in govern-
ment consumption by one standard deviation leads to a fall in the instability index
of 0.39 units, or 0.96 of a standard deviation. Finally, an increase in instability by
one standard deviation leads to a rise in the ratio of government consumption to
GDP by 7.89 percentage points, corresponding to one standard deviation.46 Let us
now consider the total effect of a one standard deviation increase in fractionaliza-
tion: first, instability increases by 0.1144. This in turn leads government consump-
tion to rise by 2.203 percentage points. Finally, this causes instability to decline by
0.1102 units. As the system equilibrates, the overall effect on instability is an
increase by 0.004, or 0.01 of a standard deviation. It should also be noted that the
direct effect of fractionalization on instability counteracts the indirect effect
through government consumption, leaving virtually no aggregate effect on insta-
bility; this was a conclusion of the model in Section I, for reasonable specifica-
tions of the instability function.
Table 8 repeats the TSLS specification of Table 7, but replaces fractionaliza-
tion by both ethnolinguistic fractionalization and religious fractionalization. In the
instability equation, both of these variables are significant in equations (2) and (4),
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44The p-value is 0.07.
45Some experimentation with different assumptions regarding excludability of the instruments was
undertaken. In particular, it is conceivable that external vulnerability is an instrument for instability. The
Rodrik variables, however, fail the Chi-squared test in this case.
46The means of government consumption and instability are 18.73 and 0.28, respectively.respectively, suggesting that ethnic and religious fractionalization independently
lead to higher political instability. Similarly, the strong evidence that government
consumption decreases instability remains. The only difference between this spec-
ification and that of Table 7 is that in the former, the point estimates on instability
in the government consumption equation fall just outside the standard significance
levels. In both equations (1) and (3) of Table 8, the p-values for instability fall to
0.12, from 0.07 when fractionalization is used as an instrument for instability. It
can therefore be concluded that it is important to take both dimensions of frac-
tionalization into account.
Table 9 assesses robustness by considering the sensitivity of the model to a
number of alternative indices of fractionalization and instability. All four alterna-
tive fractionalization indices exhibit significant positive effects on instability.
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Africa dummy –3.00 –0.43
(–1.12) (–3.35)
Latin America dummy –6.86 –0.20
(–3.19) (–2.04)


















λ 2 0.57 1.67
1Robust standard errors used; t-statistic in parentheses. Decade dummies included.Likewise, the coefficient of government consumption is always negative and
significant in each case. As usual, the most fragile result is the effect of instability
on government consumption. Another robustness test replaces the instability index
with that of Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1996); this index includes
democracy among its factors under the hypothesis that instability is biased down-
ward in nondemocratic countries. Although the hypothesized channel is much
weaker with this index, there is still evidence of it in operation. As a final robust-
ness test, the TSLS equations are reestimated, sequentially dropping each country
in order to test the sensitivity to outliers.47
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Table 8. Ethnic and Religious Fractionalization in a TSLS Model11
TSLS
Government Government
Consumption Instability Consumption Instability
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Instability 14.71 21.41
(1.55) (1.57)
Government consumption –0.06 –0.05
(–3.79) (–3.78)
Africa dummy –2.87 –0.33 –2.97 –0.37
–(1.25) (–2.68) (–1.04) (–2.91)
Latin America dummy –6.36 –0.21 –7.07 –0.18
(–3.39) (–2.02) (–2.99) (–1.81)
East Asia dummy –13.03 –0.21 –15.45 –0.24





Log GDP per capita –4.04 –0.39 –3.89 –0.44
(–3.33) (–4.43) (–2.53) (–5.10)




Sd. Dev. of terms of trade –0.35 –0.41
(–1.70) (–1.62)
External risk 0.006 0.007
(2.06) (1.96)
Urbanization rate 0.003 0.004
(1.39) (1.84)
Socialist dummy 0.23 0.23
(1.31) (1.36)
λ 2 0.41 1.48 0.87 2.52
1Robust standard errors used; t-statistic in parentheses. Decade dummies included.
47These results are unreported, and are available upon request from the author.In sum, it can be concluded that the mechanism is reasonably robust, the main
deficiency being the paucity of good instruments for instability. Furthermore, it is
important to take account of the two dimensions to fractionalization, ethnic and
religious, in unison.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has presented a hypothesis concerning the interaction between frac-
tionalization (as measured along ethnolinguistic and religious dimensions),
government consumption, and political instability. Specifically, higher fractional-
ization is held to lead exogenously to greater political instability. Partial insurance
against the political risks engendered by the instability can be bought by raising
the level of consumption. The reduced form evidence shows a strong positive rela-
tionship between fractionalization and government consumption. This paper
shows that endogenizing political instability is crucial and that once a system with
two endogenous variables is estimated, the effect of fractionalization on govern-
ment consumption is seen to operate through the political instability channel.
Furthermore, it is clear that governments use government consumption as a
buffer against political instability. One lesson to be drawn from this paper is that
it is possible for a country to reduce the level of instability, even if the country is
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Table 9. Other Definitions of Fractionalization1
(from Table 7)

















1The alternative indices refer to other indices of ethnic and religious fractionalization, as
defined in the text. Estimates and t-statistics are reported for the index itself and the resulting values
for instability and government consumption in the TSLS regression.divided into competing groups. This involves the use of government consumption.
Permitting a government to increase its consumption will reduce the level of polit-
ical instability, and numerous researchers have pointed out that political instability
is detrimental to growth.
In terms of future research, it would be useful to analyze whether it is govern-
ment consumption, pure transfers, or government investment that is most effective
in reducing political instability. It would also be interesting to endogenize military
spending, to determine whether military or non-military expenditure is more effec-
tive in reducing instability. In terms of fractionalization, it would be useful to
derive an index giving more weight to a country with a small number of large
groups to test the theory that a few powerful groups are more destabilizing than a
large number of disparate groups. Furthermore, inequitable income distribution
could be considered as another social fractionalization factor alongside ethnicity
and religion. 
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